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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alden Lamar Hoagland, Jr. pleaded guilty to one
count of sexual abuse of a minor. On appeal, Mr. Hoagland asserts that the district
court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Mindful of the fact that
the amended superceding indictment alleged the same acts as the superceding
indictment, Mr. Hoagland nevertheless asserts that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction because the amended superceding indictment charged him with a
different crime than the original indictment and was not endorsed by the foreman of the
grand jury or the prosecutor.

Therefore, the amended superceding indictment was

insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2005, Mr. Hoagland’s eight-year-old son, J.H., told a Nampa Police
Department Detective (Detective Sutherland) that Mr. Hoagland had showered with him
and asked him to wash his “weenie,” underneath his “weenie,” his “butt,” and his
“boobs.” (R., p.6.) J.H. said he did what his father asked him to. (R., p.6.) He also
said that Mr. Hoagland then washed J.H.’s “weenie,” “butt,” and “boobs.” (R., p.6.)
Subsequently, Detective Sutherland interviewed Mr. Hoagland and reported that
Mr. Hoagland confirmed his son’s story. (R., p.6.) Mr. Hoagland was then arrested for
lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen.

(R., p.6.)

Later, J.H. and Detective

Sutherland testified before a grand jury and reiterated this information. (See generally
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Tr., 1/5/05.) Based on their testimony, Mr. Hoagland was indicted for one count of lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen.1 (R., pp.16-17.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, and without resubmitting the matter to the grand
jury, the district court, at the change of plea hearing, amended the superceding
indictment and changed the lewd conduct charge to sexual abuse of a child under
sixteen.2 (See Tr. 5/2/05, p.5, L.3 – p.6, L.21; R., pp.34-35.) Mr. Hoagland agreed to
plead guilty to the amended charge and waive any issues concerning the amendments.
(Tr. 5/2/05, p.4, Ls.13-16, p.6, L.22 – p.7, L.1.) The amended superceding indictment
was not signed by the foreman of the grand jury or the prosecutor.3 The district court

The Superseding Indictment read as follows:
Count I
That the Defendant, ALDEN L. HOAGLAND, JR., as a continuing
course of conduct, on or between January 1, 2004 through June 30, 2004,
in the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did willfully and lewdly, commit a
lewd and/or lascivious act upon and/or with the body of a minor, J.H.,
under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: of the age of eight (8) years (
), by having manual to genital and/or manual to buttocks contact
with the intent to arouse, appeal to and/or gratify the lust, passion and/or
sexual desire of the defendant and/or said minor child.
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-1508 and against
the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. (R., p.17.)
2 Prior to the change of plea hearing, the indictment was amended to correct J.H.’s
it was changed to
(R., pp.29-33.)
3 The amended superceding indictment read as follows:
Count I
That the Defendant, ALDEN L. HOAGLAND, JR., on a date certain,
between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2004, in the County of Canyon,
State of Idaho, did have sexual contact with a minor, J.H., under the age
of sixteen years, to wit: of the age of eight (8) years (
), by
having manual to genital and/or manual to buttocks contact with the intent
to arouse, appeal to and/or gratify the lust, passion and/or sexual desire of
the defendant and/or said minor child.
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-1506(b) [181506(1)(b)] and against the power, peace and dignity of the State of
Idaho. (R., p.35.)
1

2

accepted Mr. Hoagland’s plea and set a date for sentencing. (Tr. 5/2/05, p.12, L.12 –
p.13, L.4.) Subsequently, the district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years,
with three and one-half years fixed. (R., pp.54-55.)
Mr. Hoagland filed a motion for correction or reduction of sentence pursuant to
I.C.R. 35(b), but the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.56-59, 72-80.) Seven
years later, Mr. Hoagland filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to
I.C.R. 35(a). (R., pp.81-87.) In that motion, Mr. Hoagland argued that, because the
matter was not resubmitted to the grand jury, the Amended Superceding Indictment was
“a nullity,” and thus failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court.
(R., p.85.) Later, Mr. Hoagland filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion
for a hearing. (R., pp.102-07.) The district court granted both motions and held a
hearing on the matter on September 13, 2013. (R., pp.108-12.) After the hearing, the
district court ordered that transcripts of the original 2005 hearings be produced, and it
set a briefing schedule. (R., pp.115-16, 119-21.) Both parties subsequently submitted
briefs on the issue. (R., pp.124-37.)
Thereafter, on July 29, 2014, the district court entered an order denying the
motion to correct an illegal sentence.

(R., pp.140-50.)

It held that, because

Mr. Hoagland “pled guilty to the Sexual Abuse charge on the same operative facts
alleged in both the Superceding Indictment and the Amended Superceding Indictment,”
the Amended Superceding Indictment was valid, and the district court had jurisdiction
over the matter. (R., pp.148-49.) Mr. Hoagland then filed a Notice of Appeal that was
timely from the district court’s order denying the motion. (R., pp.151-54.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoagland’s I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an
illegal sentence?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hoagland’s I.C.R. 35 Motion To Correct An
Illegal Sentence
A.

Introduction
Mr. Hoagland asserts that the district court erred when it denied his I.C.R. 35(a)

motion to correct an illegal sentence because the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. Mindful of the fact that the amended superceding indictment alleged the
same acts as the superceding indictment, Mr. Hoagland argues that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amended superceding indictment
charged him with a different crime than the original indictment and was not endorsed by
the foreman of the grand jury or the prosecutor.
B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is a

question of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757
(2004). Whether an information or indictment conforms to legal requirements is also a
question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Id. The issue of whether the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case can be raised at any time, including for
the first time on appeal or in a I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at
758; State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 838-39 (2011) (holding that the court had jurisdiction
to consider defendant’s I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hoagland’s I.C.R. 35 Motion
Alleging An Illegal Sentence Because The District Court Lacked Subject Matter
Jurisdiction
Mr. Hoagland asserts that the record in this case establishes that the trial court

did not have subject matter jurisdiction to accept his guilty plea, or sentence him upon
his conviction. Therefore, Mr. Hoagland asks this Court to reverse the district court’s
order denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence and remand this case to the
district court with instructions to vacate his conviction. See Lute, 150 Idaho at 840-841.
1.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution provides “[n]o person shall be held to
answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or
indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor . . . .”
It is the filing of an indictment or information that confers subject matter
jurisdiction on the district court with regard to the charges contained therein. Jones, 140
Idaho at 757. “The indictment or information filed by the prosecution is the jurisdictional
instrument upon which a defendant stands trial.” Id. In light of this, the district court’s
subject matter jurisdiction over the charges brought against the defendant is dependent
upon the legal sufficiency of the indictment or information containing those charges. Id.
at 758. In this case, the amended indictment was insufficient because it charged a
different offense than the indictment issued by the grand jury.
The Idaho Supreme Court considers two standards in determining the legal
sufficiency of an indictment: (1) whether an indictment or information is legally sufficient
for the purposes of due process; and (2) whether an indictment or information is legally
sufficient for the purpose of imparting jurisdiction.
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Id. at 757-58.

The charging

document satisfies due process when it contains factual specificity sufficient to inform a
person of common understanding of what is intended and to shield against double
jeopardy.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 708 (2009).

“An indictment confers

jurisdiction when it alleges that the defendant committed a criminal offense in the State
of Idaho.” Id. Further, “[a]n indictment cannot be found with the concurrence of at least
twelve (12) grand jurors. When so found it must be endorsed, a true bill, and the
endorsement must be signed by the foreman of the grand jury.” I.C. § 19-1401.
Although the district court may permit a complaint, information, or indictment to
be amended, the Idaho Criminal Rules only permit such amendment “if no additional or
different offense is charged.” I.C.R. 7(e). In State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808 (1967),
the Idaho Supreme Court held as follows:
An accused is denied, therefore, his constitutional right to a preliminary
hearing where an information is filed or subsequently amended charging
him with a crime of a greater degree or of a different nature than that for
which he was held by the committing magistrate.
It is, additionally, in this state, specifically provided by statute that a
different and distinct offense may not be charged by way of amended
information. I.C. § 19-1420. State v. Thompson [392 S.W.2d 617
(Mo.1965).]
State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho at 817–18 (footnote omitted).
In Lute, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court never had subject
matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s case because the grand jury never issued a
valid indictment. 150 Idaho at 841. Thus, the Court reversed the district court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion for correction of an illegal sentence and remanded the case
with instructions to grant the motion and vacate the conviction. Id. Therefore, when
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there is no valid indictment from a grand jury, there is no subject matter jurisdiction.
The remedy is to vacate the conviction.
2.

Because The Amended Superseding Indictment Charged Mr. Hoagland
With A Different And Distinct Offense, It Was Invalid, And Mr. Hoagland’s
Conviction Was Void

Mr. Hoagland properly challenged the district court’s lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. He asserted that the Amended Superceding Indictment failed to confer
jurisdiction because the charge of Sexual Abuse was a new charge that was never
submitted to the grand jury. (R., pp.84-85, pp.127-28.) Thus, he alleged the Amended
Superseding Indictment was invalid.
In State v. O’Neill, 118 Idaho 244 (1990), O’Neill was charged with two counts of
lewd conduct and, pursuant to an amended information, entered a plea of guilty to one
count sexual abuse of a minor. Id. at 245. On review, the question arose as to whether
the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the amended information
charged a new crime for which O’Neill did not have a preliminary hearing. Id. at 248.
The Court held,
O’Neill had pled guilty to violating § 18-1506 upon the same facts alleged
in the original Information and the Amended Information. He clearly
understood the acts for which he was being charged. No different facts
were alleged in the Amended Information. Violation of I.C. § 18-1506 is a
lesser included offense when an individual is charged with violations of
I.C. § 18-1508.
Id. at 249-50.
In State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525 (2011), the defendant was indicted by a grand
jury for the crime of lewd conduct. During the jury trial, the district court instructed the
jury regarding the crime of lewd conduct and, as an included offense, the crime of
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sexual abuse of a child under sixteen. Id. at 526. The lewd conduct charge was based
on the allegation that Flegel had touched the minor’s vagina, and the sexual abuse
charge was based upon evidence that he touched her buttocks. Id. The jury found
Flegel not guilty of lewd conduct but did not reach a verdict on the sexual abuse charge.
Id. Without resubmitting the issue to a grand jury, the State then filed an amended
indictment charging Flegel with one count of sexual abuse. Id. Flegel was then tried by
a jury on that charge and found guilty. Id. Flegel appealed, and the Idaho Court of
Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.

Id.

Subsequently, the Idaho Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review. Id.
The Court analyzed whether sexual abuse was a lesser included offense of lewd
conduct, ultimately finding that sexual abuse was not a lesser included offense of lewd
conduct under the statutory theory. Id. at 527. The Court also found that sexual abuse
was not a lesser included offense under the pleading theory; it noted that, in the
amended indictment, “[t]he State changed the allegation of ‘manual to genital contact’
[the act in the original indictment] to ‘sexual contact.’” Id. at 530.
The Court held, “[t]he prosecuting attorney had no authority to issue an amended
indictment for a crime that was not an included offense of that crime.” Id. at 526. The
Court explained the statutory and constitutional basis underlying its decision as follows:
Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution states that “[n]o person shall
be held to answer for any felony . . . unless on presentment or indictment
of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor, after a
commitment by a magistrate . . . .” Because a felony can only be
prosecuted by an indictment found by a grand jury or by an information
based upon the commitment of a magistrate (following a preliminary
hearing or its waiver), Idaho Code section 19-1420 provides: “An
information or indictment cannot be amended so as to charge an offense
other than that for which the defendant has been held to answer.” To
allow a prosecutor to amend an indictment to charge an offense other than
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that for which the defendant was held to answer would permit the
prosecutor to, in essence, become the grand jury.
Id. at 526-27. As such, the Court held that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the sexual abuse charge. Id. at 531.
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its opinion in State v. Schmierer, 2016
Opinion No. 15 (Idaho Feb. 26, 2016).

There, a grand jury issued an indictment

charging Schmierer with one count of enticing children over the internet and one count
of attempted lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. Id. at 2. Pursuant to
a plea agreement, the State filed an Amended Superceding Indictment, which charged
Schmierer with the same enticement charge but changed Count II from the original
attempted lewd conduct charge to another enticement charge based on entirely different
facts.

Id.

The amended indictment was signed by the prosecutor instead of the

foreman of the grand jury. Id. Schmierer pleaded guilty to both counts. Id.
Later, Schmierer filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal
sentence. Id. In that motion, he argued that the district court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over Count II because it charged a new offense that was never
submitted to the grand jury. Id. The district court denied the motion, but Schmierer
appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision. Id. at 3.
Subsequently, the Idaho Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review.
It held that, even though the indictment was not amended by the grand jury or signed by
the foreman of the grand jury, the indictment was “in substance an information
mislabeled as an indictment.” Id. at 5. It stated, “Had the ‘Amended Superceding
Indictment’ been labeled as an ‘Information,’ there would be no question that it
conferred jurisdiction over the second enticement charge. The charging document was
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signed by the prosecutor.”

Id.

The Court went on to say that “[t]he fact that the

charging document was entitled ‘true bill’ rather than ‘information’ is best categorized as
a defect in form.” Id. It noted that, under I.C. § 19-1419, a defect in form that does not
prejudice the defendant does not render the indictment insufficient. Id. As such, it held
that “[w]here the charging document meets the substantive requirements for an
information, but is labeled an indictment . . . it may be treated as an information.” Id. It
found that Schmierer was not prejudiced by the “mislabeling of the charging document”
and therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Mr. Schmierer’s Rule 35 motion.
Id. at 6.
In this case, the district court found that “[a]n analysis of the pleadings in this
case indicate that O’Neill, rather than Flegel, controls.”

(R., p.148.)

It held that,

because Mr. Hoagland “pled guilty to the Sexual Abuse charge on the same operative
facts alleged in both the Superceding Indictment and Amended Superceding
Indictment,” the amended indictment was valid, and thus the district court had
jurisdiction. (R., pp.148-49.) The relevant language of the superceding indictment in
this case read as follows:
did willfully and lewdly, commit a lewd and/or lascivious act upon and/or
with the body of a minor, J.H., under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: of the
age of eight (8) years (
), by having manual to genital
and/or manual to buttocks contact with the intent to arouse, appeal to
and/or gratify the lust, passion and/or sexual desire of the defendant
and/or said minor child.
(R., p.17.) The relevant language of the amended superceding indictment read
as follows:
did have sexual contact with a minor, J.H., under the age of sixteen years,
to wit: of the age of eight (8) years (
), by having manual to
genital and/or manual to buttocks contact with the intent to arouse, appeal
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to and/or gratify the lust, passion and/or sexual desire of the defendant
and/or said minor child.
(R., p.35.)
Mindful of the fact that both indictments charged him with having “manual to
genital and/or manual to buttocks contact,” Mr. Hoagland asserts that the amended
superceding indictment was insufficient because, just as in Flegel, it was amended to
allege a different charge. (R., pp.34-35.) Further, the amended superceding indictment
was not signed by anyone and therefore did meet the requirements of I.C. § 19-1401,
which states that the “true bill” endorsement “must be signed by the foreman of the
grand jury.”

(R., pp.17, 35.) As such, unlike the amended superceding indictment in

Schmierer, the amended superceding indictment in this case cannot be “treated as an
information” because it was not signed by the prosecutor.

(R., p.35.)

Thus the

amended superceding indictment was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on
the district court.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hoagland respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district
court with instructions to vacate his judgment and commitment for sexual abuse
because the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over this charge.
DATED this 18th day of April, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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